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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explains why multinational companies should be concerned about adjudication of 
international insolvencies.  The Territorialism and Universalism Models of bankruptcy law are 
reviewed and employed as a backdrop to describe recent developments in the insolvency laws of 
four Asian nations.   We conclude with an assessment of the status of the selected Asian nations’ 
insolvency laws, progress toward a uniform global system for resolving multinational 
insolvencies, and the strategic implications these developments hold for strategy formulation.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
lobalization of both markets and the production function requires multinational corporations to consider 
the global economy as a single market.  This paradigm shift has created dramatic changes in the 
fundamental way international business is conducted.  For example, by the end of the twentieth century, 
the U.S. share of world output had decreased by 50%, along with its contribution of worldwide foreign direct 
investment (FDI) decreasing by approximately 67% (Hill, 2001).  In comparison, Western European and Southeast 
Asian economies were increasing their share of world output, while a large number of Japanese and European 
multinationals emerged.  Globalizing markets and production has stimulated both world trade growth and FDI, and 
created new competitive pressures in many industries.  Additionally, the overall number of multinational firms has 
grown dramatically as firms attempt to take advantage of market share, profit, and growth opportunities that are 
increasingly available in the global economy.  The increase of firms in the emerging global market seeking new 
avenues for growth has generated enormous competitive pressure. This pressure has led multinationals to expand 
their quest for novel strategic opportunities in foreign markets, cultures, and nations, but it has also increased the 
risk of strategic failure, and ultimately, bankruptcy.   
 
Entry into foreign marketplaces by an increasing number of multinational corporations has resulted in a 
corresponding upsurge in the amount of insolvency cases experienced in the international arena. This trend suggests 
that multination firms must become knowledgeable regarding transnational bankruptcy protocols.  Previously, this 
investigation resided in the realm of legal scholars, but recent debates have centered this issue within the confines of 
multinational business strategy and its development (Brewerton and LeMaster, 2002). 
 
EMERGING ISSUES 
 
 The advent of globalization has created two issues one of which is strategic and the other legal in nature: 
(1) the paramount obligation for a multinational company to coordinate a contingency strategy should its original 
strategy fails and an insolvency results; and (2) the obvious need for a uniform bankruptcy law and court system to 
manage international firm insolvencies.  Although a firm typically does not consciously formulate a strategic 
G 
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objective to declare bankruptcy, without a contingency strategy in this area a multinational company could find itself 
preparing an insolvency plan without the guidance of prior strategic consideration.  The reality of insolvency should 
be a fundamental component of any firm’s strategic planning process. Acknowledgement of a potential insolvency 
should include an awareness of existing bankruptcy laws and courts, and the course of action necessary to minimize 
the negative impact of insolvency.  The strategy literature provides only scant and general treatment of the 
formulation of insolvency contingency plans. 
 
 The community of legal scholars seems largely in agreement that the ideal adjudication of transnational 
insolvencies requires a standardized bankruptcy law and uniform court system that do not exist at this time.  The 
lack of a single standardized system to manage insolvencies in the international arena has sparked dialogue within 
the community of legal scholars that focuses on the desire to obtain the optimal legal solution for resolving 
international defaults.  Guzman (2000) suggests methods for the adjudication of international insolvencies that are 
polar extremes.  The methods are the “territorialism” model and the “universalism” model.  A brief summary of 
each model follows. 
 
THE TERRITORIAL MODEL OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
 
 Territoriality is a concept that each individual country holds the sovereign right to govern within its own 
borders. This perception is a basic tenant of international law that is simply accepted but also often overlooked.  It is 
considered the default rule for many areas of law including constitutional law, taxation, trademarks, industrial 
regulation, debt collection and bankruptcy (LoPucki, 2000).  Within the realm of multinational corporations and 
bankruptcy law, the application of territoriality or territorialism indicates that the designated bankruptcy court of a 
nation holds jurisdiction over those portions of the firm that strictly operate within its borders and excludes those 
portions that occur outside the national boundary (LoPucki, 2000).  In lieu of binding treaties or other agreements to 
the contrary, nations operating under the territorial system are restricted to enforcing local laws on assets or persons 
within their own borders.  Until the establishment and enforcement of such treaties or agreements, the prevailing 
system, territorialism, is the international law of bankruptcy.  
 
 In the case where a multinational corporation encounters financial problems that fall within the boundaries 
of a single nation, the firm has two options: liquidation or reorganization within that country while the firm’s foreign 
entities remain unaffected.  In the case where a firm’s assets are solely confined to domestic operations in a single 
country, the options are liquidation or reorganization pursuant to the insolvency laws that govern the nation in which 
operations are based. 
 
 In the case where a firm’s operations reach across national boundaries and financial difficulties arise, each 
individual entity follows the insolvency protocol that presides where the assets are held.  The result is the creation of 
one bankruptcy estate in each country where assets are held.  Under the territorial system, cooperation is a 
fundamental requirement among governing entities across borders.  In essence a “parallel” bankruptcy proceeding 
commences in each individual country with a local court appointing a representative assigned to each estate for the 
duration of the insolvency proceeding.  The court-appointed representative is charged with the duty to negotiate a 
court-approved remedy to resolve the financial issues with the knowledge that the actions may require cooperation 
that extends across national borders.  When the estates are considered as a combined entity and found to hold greater 
value than their individual holdings, the court-appointed representatives should facilitate the proceeding to honor the 
consolidated amount. If the representatives are unable to reach an agreement regarding the assets in the consolidated 
amount, the assets are liquidated or reorganized with the proceeds distributed pursuant to each respective country’s 
governing insolvency laws. 
 
THE UNIVERSALISM MODEL OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
 
 In absolute terms universalism stipulates that the administration of multinational insolvency cases be 
managed by a court that provides a single bankruptcy law applied within the debtor firm’s home nation.  Westbrook 
(2000) and Guzman (2000) both extol the benefits of universalism.  Universalism is viewed as both a realistic tool 
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and a simpler, more effective way to manage the complexities of multinational insolvency cases.  However, 
universalism is predicated on several assumed conditions about the real world. 
 
 Westbrook (2000) stipulates that two essential components required under a universalism construct are the 
necessity for a single presiding bankruptcy law and a single forum (court and/or court system) to govern each 
multinational case.  A single insolvency law that is recognized across national borders would provide a single set of 
protocols for the administration and dispersing of assets. A universal system would foster a sense of equality for all 
involved stakeholders due to the propagation of similar legal rights extended across the globe.  The acceptance of a 
single governing law would provide a fluid framework for the transfer-avoidance rules that protect all creditors 
against strategic behavior by debtors and other creditors (Westbrook, 2000). 
 
 The establishment of a unified system of international bankruptcy courts would provide complementary 
benefits.  A single bankruptcy court system that administers a single bankruptcy law should produce a more reliable 
and predictable set of bankruptcy case outcomes.  If there were but a single international bankruptcy court (as 
contrasted to a unified court system), an even higher degree of uniformity, consistency, and predictability would 
likely be possible.  A single court would provide a unified approach to assembly and sale of assets, could more 
effectively protect those assets prior to sale, and would make prevention or reversal of debtor fraud easier and more 
certain.  This is a particularly urgent need in a world of electronic funds transfer, asset protection trusts, and other 
devices currently being used to accomplish debtor fraud. 
 
 A balance between the prevailing laws and the marketplace is also required under the universalism system. 
This system demands that the governing laws encapsulate all the related transactions and stakeholders in the market.  
In addition to the balance between the prevailing laws and the marketplace, the universalism model requires a 
convergence to occur among other laws that preside over creditors’ priority, setoff, security interests, debt collection 
and other related concepts.   The political function that surrounds all policy-making and negotiation is the apparent 
stalling mechanism responsible for failure to adopt the universal model. Consequently, according to Westbrook 
(2000) the universalism model is not likely to be adopted in the foreseeable future.  The global market provides a 
bridge to the convergence of these related laws supported by the initiatives of the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank (Westbrook, 2000). Countries such as Germany, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Japan, Russia, 
China, and most of Eastern Europe have rewritten their insolvency laws, while Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand 
have instituted insolvency laws, and Japan, Great Britain, and Mexico have reformed their prevailing laws. 
Additionally there has been a proliferation of the United Nations Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency presented 
by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Laws (UNCITRAL).  The European Union and NAFTA 
nations’ dedication to creating a clear coordination of transnational insolvency procedures is yet another example of 
the convergence of related laws.  These adoptions, revisions, reforms, and initiatives are the result of an extensive 
examination and analysis of these nation’s insolvency laws and reform proposals (Westbrook, 2000). 
 
BANKRUPTCY LAWS IN SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES 
 
The Asian countries selected for this study were Japan, South Korea, the People’s Republic of China, and 
Taiwan.  The criteria used to select the countries in this study included average annual percentage of gross domestic 
product growth (GDP), percentage growth in FDI, and membership in the World Trade Organization. These four 
countries were chosen due to their substantial growth across these indicators from 2000 to 2005 
(www.worldbank.org, 2007), and because there seems to be a strong correlation between these factors and an 
observed propensity to modify bankruptcy laws to accommodate and stimulate growth in GDP and FDI. 
 
Japan 
 
 Japan is still considered to be a very progressive, highly industrialized nation even though it has 
experienced severe economic distress as evidenced by the significant decrease in GDP over the last 20 years.  FDI in 
Japan has also waned from a high of $12.3B in 1999 to $8B in 2004 (www.worldbank.org, 2007).  The answer to 
Japan’s economic distress may result from further infrastructure reforms to regain its competitive position.  
Although essential improvements have occurred in the telecommunications and financial services sectors, sustained 
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recovery hinges on a renewed confidence that can only be achieved through “continued structural reforms” (WTO, 
2007, p. 1), one of which may involve additional modification of insolvency laws. 
 
 Japan’s current insolvency laws originate from several laws, including the Commercial Code Law No. 48, 
of 1899, Bankruptcy Law No. 48 of 1900, Company Reorganization Law No. 172 of 1952, and most recently the 
Civil Rehabilitation Law of 2000. Following multiple amendments, five legal systems exist that are organized into 
two categories:  liquidation-type systems and reconstruction-type systems (Worldbank GILD, n.d.).  The liquidation 
types include bankruptcy, hasan, governed by the Bankruptcy Law and special liquidation, tokubetsu-seisan that is 
governed by Commercial Code, both under Law No. 48.  The grounds for filing for insolvency under the 
liquidation-type system are two-fold:  1) when the debtor is continuously unable to make his payments, and 2) when 
the sum of the assets is exceeded by the liabilities (Worldbank GILD, n.d. p. 5).  When insolvency is adjudicated a 
trustee is appointed by the court. 
 
 The second category of reconstruction insolvencies is handled through reorganization, arrangement, and 
rehabilitation legal systems.  Reorganization allows a firm to find a way out of its insolvency rather than liquidating.  
If the court agrees that rehabilitation is possible then with the agreement of both the creditors and the court, the debts 
are discounted and rescheduled.  Reorganization in Japan has some similarities to Chapter 11 provisions of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy code.  Company arrangements are much more flexible than reorganization and are designed to help a 
company resolve its insolvency issues without liquidating.  Company arrangements appear to be exactly what the 
term suggests:  an arrangement between debtors and creditors that allows the company to continue operations 
without liquidating.  One major difference between company reorganization and arrangement is that the 
management of the firm does “not necessarily lose control of the company” under a corporate arrangement 
(Worldbank GILD, n.d., p. 2). 
 
 A civil rehabilitation of a firm is similar to company arrangement only from the perspective of management 
not losing control of the firm.  The purpose of management maintaining control in this case is to “administer and 
dispose of the properties” (Worldbank GILD, n.d., p. 2), while there are other “rules” that prevail regarding security 
interests.  What is an extraordinary rule is that the debtor can elect on his/her own initiative to extinguish the 
security interests required for continuance of the business.  These security interests include real property and 
personal property.  In all cases the most commonly used form for resolution of insolvency issues is through “private 
arrangements” rather than formal legal proceedings (Worldbank GILD, n.d., p. 1). 
 
South Korea 
  
South Korea, like Japan, became a member of the World Trade Organization in 1995.  From 2000 to 2004, 
South Korea has outpaced Japan both in terms of the annual percentage of gross domestic product and FDI, 
excluding FDI net inflows of 2003 (www.worldbank.org, 2007). Given that Japan is at least twice the size of South 
Korea, economically, these differences are understandable.  However, GDP growth for South Korea is projected to 
increase only slowly over the next couple of years (www.economist.com, 2005).  The slowdown is attributed to the 
anticipated decrease in exports. 
 
 Both composition and corporate reorganization are used in South Korea to resolve insolvency problems 
(Worldbank GILD, n.d.).  Composition allows for the firm to continue to operate, and protects secured claims from 
being impeded.  Corporate reorganization is designed only for corporations.  It requires that a trustee be assigned by 
the courts to administer the reorganization.  All entities, even secured claims, are subject to the restrictions imposed 
by corporate reorganization.  Unlike composition, corporate reorganization can be initiated by either the debtor(s) or 
the shareholder(s). 
 
Among the four countries studied, South Korea’s insolvency laws most closely emulate the territorialism 
model of bankruptcy.  Currently, what happens in South Korea stays in South Korea, because there is no recognition 
of foreign bankruptcy proceedings.  Consequently ancillary administration of insolvency proceedings is not possible.  
If the debtor firm is situated inside South Korea, but insolvency proceedings are initiated outside of the nation, the 
proceedings are simply not recognized.  Also, if insolvency proceedings are begun domestically there is no standing 
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regarding assets held outside the country (Chung, 2005; Han, 2005).  The only possible exception is with respect to 
cross-border insolvency that is addressed in a separate section. 
 
South Korea has pending legislation regarding insolvency that proposes a rehabilitative procedure.  This 
procedure will create a debtor-friendly scenario providing for the possible continuation of management by the firm 
managers.  Proposed in 2003, this legislation is entitled the Act on Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy of Debtors, but is 
also known as the Unified Insolvency Act (Chung, 2005; Han, 2005). The Act requires the appointment of a 
company representative for the debtor firm, while the court may impede debt collection until the reorganization 
procedures begin (Han, 2005).       
 
People’s Republic Of China 
 
 Over the past few years the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has demonstrated extraordinary average 
annual percentage GDP growth and FDI inflows compared to other Asian countries.  The PRC became a member of 
the World Trade Organization in 2001 and experienced an average annual percentage GDP growth of 8% in 2000 
and 10% from 2003 to 2005, with FDI increasing from $38.8B in 1999 to $55.5B in 2005 (www.worldbank.org, 
2007).  Not surprisingly the PRC does not have a unified bankruptcy law (Barker and Purser, 2004), nor do the PRC 
law provisions closely approximate the type of bankruptcy law provisions found in the most economically 
developed countries.  Bankruptcy procedure is dependent upon the type of entity claiming insolvency and among 
other governmental and regulatory bodies, the approval of the Ministry of Commerce.  The courts have very limited 
involvement, if any, given that a separate independent judiciary with bankruptcy expertise does not exist.  Similarly, 
the reallocation of assets occurs before the remainder is paid out to the creditors.  The creditors have little recourse if 
they disagree with the outcomes and have minimal opportunity to participate in the bankruptcy process.  As a 
consequence the “reallocation” or disposition of assets may not result in maximizing recoveries and the creditors are 
left with less than what possibly could have been recovered (Barker and Purser, 2004). 
 
 The PRC is a phenomenal case due to the intense multinational interest in doing business in or with China 
as evidenced by the enormous FDI inflows. Given this enormous economic growth in the PRC and the 
accompanying unknowns for foreign entities operating there, it seems that both the PRC as well as the strategists 
employed by the companies going to China should be immensely interested in the laws and resolutions regarding 
insolvency.  Currently, the legal infrastructure in the PRC is improving its inefficient and ill-defined insolvency 
practices (Kwan, 2006; Field, 2005).   
 
The PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy and Reorganization Law, also known as the Draft Bankruptcy Law (DBL), 
was introduced in June 2004 as a means toward the reform of outdated and inadequate existing laws.  Wang (2005) 
explained that the DBL will make “bankruptcy a more viable means of debt liquidation”, but the problem is that 
beyond the inability to pay overdue debts there is no explanation required regarding the reasons for the firm filing 
bankruptcy (p. 5). With anticipation of reforming previous outdated and narrow laws governing bankruptcy, Jing 
(2004) reported that the new bankruptcy law will address reciprocity in an effort to move legal processes away from 
the former territorialism model toward a limited universalism model. This discussion incited debate and eventually 
evolved into a further reaching law.    
 
 The Corporate Bankruptcy Law will go into effect June 1, 2007. This law provides stipulations regarding 
“the procedure for a company’s bankruptcy and liquidation” and discusses the rights of involved parties (Kwan, 
2006, p. 1). Previously, State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the PRC were provided government subsidy during a 
bankruptcy process (Kwan, 2006; Luan, 2006; New Bankruptcy Law, 2006). Until the new Law is enacted, SOEs 
will receive governmental support. The new Law is a move toward international agreements by holding “debtor’s 
overseas assets” and acknowledging foreign judicial findings regarding insolvency cases (Kwan, 2006, p. 1).       
 
Republic Of China (Taiwan) 
 
 Taiwan has experienced terrific economic growth reporting an average annual percentage GDP growth of 
3.1% from 2001 to 2005 and 4.3% in 2006 (www.economist.com, 2007).  A leveling off is expected as part of the 
normal process of growth and development.  Among the four countries of study, Taiwan is the newest member of 
the World Trade Organization joining in 2002.  The need for insolvency reform is a result of the positive economic 
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growth, but to date no unified code for bankruptcy exists.  Insolvency disputes in Taiwan do not involve lawsuits or 
legal disputes.  They are considered “non-litigious” procedures (Lui, Lee, and Li, 2002).   
 
 Insolvency proceedings are governed by different entities in Taiwan (Lui et al., 2002).  For example 
corporate reorganization for publicly-held companies is governed by The Company Law that is maintained by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs.  Subsidiaries, however, are not included.  Liquidation and composition proceedings 
are governed by The Bankruptcy Code that is maintained by the Judicial Yuan, but there is no bankruptcy court.   
 
Insolvency law reforms in Taiwan began in the 1990’s and since that time the Company Law and the 
Bankruptcy Law were amended with the suggestion that the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
be employed as a guide for reform (Lui et al., 2002).  There is no evidence that reformation efforts to create a 
unified law to resolve bankruptcy have resulted in substantial changes.  A white paper on banking in Taiwan noted 
that no real progress had been made and the recommendation for legislative reform was reiterated (American 
Chamber of Commerce, 2004).  An outstanding example of the need for reform and the evidence of no real progress 
having been made is a company, Tanun, that filed for reorganization and after 16 years still does not have a plan for 
reorganization (McGowan, 2001). It appears that the call for reform has gone unheard and Taiwan’s Reorganization 
Law remains grossly inefficient and biased (American Chamber of Commerce, 2006). 
 
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 
 
 Given globalization, internationalization, and the continued growth in multinational corporations, the need 
for laws governing cross-border insolvency should be paramount to countries and corporations.  In 1997, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. The 
Model Law was “designed to assist States to equip their insolvency laws with a modern, harmonized, and fair 
framework to address more effectively instances of cross-border insolvency” (UNCITRAL, 1997, p. 15). Insolvency 
is defined as “when a debtor is generally unable to pay its debts as they mature or when its liabilities exceed the 
value of its assets” (UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, 2005, p. 5).  Cross-border insolvency is 
defined as “an insolvency case that has been commenced in one jurisdiction but which is relevant to another or other 
jurisdiction” (Harmer and Fisher, 2002, p.2). Cross-border cases concern those cases initiated in one location by the 
appropriate creditor, shareholder, or debtor, but the assets or other creditors or concerned entities reside in another 
location, each with different jurisdictions.    
 
 The General Assembly’s resolution included provisions for (1) transmitting the text of the law along with a 
guide to its enactment to governments and interested bodies; (2) recommending that member states review their 
cross-border insolvency legislation to determine its compatibility with the Model Law and to give favorable 
consideration to the Model Law; and (3) recommending that the Model Law become “generally known and 
available.”  (United Nations A/Rec/52/158).   The adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law represents a major 
development toward the eventual achievement of a single universal law governing multinational insolvencies.  
However, the United Nations has no policing authority that might mandate the adoption of the Model Law as the 
insolvency law of the land.  Individual states are free to ignore or embrace the Model Law  - wholly or partially – as 
they see fit. 
 
 In the absence of laws or legal venues that govern cross-border insolvencies, informal processes take over 
that may not ensure fairness of resolutions of insolvencies.  Some countries follow “common law” where the 
principle of “comity” exists.  Comity is a judge-made doctrine, unsupported by legislation, but is designed to assist 
in resolutions between or among different jurisdictions (Harmer and Fisher, 2002).  The advantage of comity is that 
in the absence of treaties or conventions, or other types of agreements, a court can employ comity to help settle a 
case.  The disadvantage is the lack of consistency of application of the use of comity and the uncertain and 
unpredictable results it produces. 
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EARLY IMPACT OF THE MODEL LAW 
 
 In 2001, Japan enacted the Law on Recognition of and Assistance in Foreign Insolvency Proceedings.  This 
law was designed after the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Field, 2005).  Prior to this time 
Japan practiced territorialism with regard to cross-border asset disagreements and bankruptcies (Takagi, 2004).  
Under the new law after the debtor’s trustee has filed for the bankruptcy, the foreign representative must prove the 
residence/office of the debtor is located within the country where the Foreign Proceeding was filed.  In essence, an 
appointed trustee is given the right to apply for recognition in court for a foreign bankruptcy case (Takagi, 2004).  
 
 In South Korea, the territorial model of bankruptcy applies, except with the Corporation Reorganization 
Act of Korea that provides aliens of foreign corporations can hold the same status as that of a Korean national (Park, 
2003). The intent of the proposed Act Concerning the Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy of Debtors is to unify 
prevailing insolvency statutes and abandon the territorial model (Han, 2005). It appears that the PRC is moving 
away from the territorial model that did not acknowledge foreign judicial findings and has managed domestic 
insolvency cases on an individual basis.  The PRC’s new Corporate Bankruptcy Law is a step toward the cross-
border model with its recognition of foreign court’s findings and grasp on foreign assets held by a debtor. Cross-
border issues seldom arise in Taiwan primarily, because foreign investors create subsidiaries within Taiwan and 
Taiwanese investors establish subsidiaries outside Taiwan.  As a consequence, territorialism with regard to 
whichever country holds the assets prevails in Taiwan.  Taiwan’s insolvency laws apply only to local legal 
proceedings. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has presented the current status of four Asian nations’ insolvency laws in light of the current 
globalization phenomena. These firms were selected for this study based on their recent growth in GDP and FDI, 
and their membership in the world Trade Organization.  This comparative analysis should assist multinational 
companies in formulating contingency plans while operating in the international arena by providing current 
information regarding the manner in which multinational insolvencies are resolved. The survey of insolvency laws 
produced a number of conclusions.  
 
 The first conclusion of this paper is that the recent developments and changes in bankruptcy laws in the 
four study countries provide scant evidence that the countries’ laws are moving the countries in the direction of 
universalism despite such claims by other authors and researchers.  The recent changes in Japan’s laws include 
provisions which parallel to some extent the provisions contained in many of the western countries’ laws, but fall far 
short of approaching any type of universal statute.  South Korea’s bankruptcy statute clearly remains strictly 
territorial in nature and completely disdains all proceedings of foreign countries.  The Peoples Republic of China has 
made recent changes in bankruptcy law provisions that bear some similarity to the provisions commonly found in 
western countries’ bankruptcy statutes but taken as a whole the PRC statutes still must be viewed as extremely 
territorial in nature and generally unlike the statutes found in any of the developed countries.  Similarly, so-called 
reforms in the prevailing laws in Taiwan that bring the country closer to emulating western countries’ laws are more 
rhetorical than substantive, and Taiwan’s laws continue to be a prime example of extreme territorialism. 
 
 A second conclusion of this paper is that the UNCITRAL Model Law on Insolvency has some impact, 
thereby influencing some countries’ efforts to reform their bankruptcy laws to include general provisions found in 
most western countries’ laws.  There is some evidence of the influence of the UNICITRAL law on the development 
of new bankruptcy law provisions in both Japan and the People’s Republic of China, but the influence seems 
minimal at this time.  The UNICITRAL Model Law seems to be the major factor currently affecting bankruptcy law 
reform efforts in a number of countries.  However, the nature of the reforms as manifested in changes to bankruptcy 
statutes in various countries cannot be described as a global movement toward universalism.  At best, the recent 
changes in bankruptcy statutes in these countries can be characterized as a movement toward “limited universalism” 
or “modified territorialism.”  Regardless of which term is used, the developments have not been sufficiently 
significant to signal a major movement toward a single global bankruptcy law applicable to all countries, nor do 
these developments suggest that there is a movement toward a single court system for adjudicating multinational 
insolvencies. 
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 A final conclusion of this paper is that the recent changes in bankruptcy laws in the four study countries 
provide little guidance to multinational company strategists.  The answer to the question, “Should multinational 
company strategies be concerned?” is “yes”, but with qualifications. 
 
 On the positive side, strategists should applaud the changes in the four countries’ bankruptcy laws, because 
they collectively suggest that the provisions of the four countries’ laws are becoming more similar to provisions 
typically found in western countries’ laws.  On the negative side, the four countries’ bankruptcy adjudication 
systems remain distinctive and different, are clearly territorial in nature, and will continue to require intense study to 
determine the optimal strategic actions to be followed in the event that an insolvency occurs within any of these 
countries. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. American Chamber of Commerce (2004). Taiwan White Paper. 
http://www.amcham.com.tw/dl/2004WP_Positions.pdf. 
2. American Chamber of Commerce (2006). Taiwan White Paper. http://www.amcham.com.tw/d1/2006wp.pdf. 
3. Barker, M. and Purser, R. (2004). Bankruptcy reform in China, Freshfields, Bruckhaus, and Deringer. 
www.globalinsolvency.com.  
4. Brewerton, F.J., and LeMaster, J. (2002). Emerging models of international bankruptcy law: Strategic 
implications for multinational companies. International Business and Economics Research Journal (1) 10: 1-9. 
5. Chung, K.S. (2005). Korean government’s proposed bill for the unified insolvency act. http://adb.bdw.com.uia. 
6. Economist (2005). Economist Forecast. http://www.economist.com/countries/SouthKorea. 
7. Economist (2007). Economist Factsheet. http://www.economist.com/countries/Taiwan. 
8. Field, A.M. (2005). New global rules for bankruptcy. The Journal of Commerce. 
9. Guzman, A.T. (2000). International bankruptcy: In defense of universalism. Michigan Law Review (98): 7: 2177-
2215. 
10. Han, S. (2005). New unified insolvency act. www.asialaw.com. 
11. Harmer, R. and Fisher, R. (2002). Promoting regional cooperation in the development of insolvency reform. 
Asian Development Bank. http://adb.bdw.com.  
12. Hill, C.W.L. (2001). Global Business. Boston: Irwin McGraw-Hill. 
13. Jing, Z. (2004). China’s new bankruptcy law perfect the legal system of the market economy. China Economic 
Net. http://en-1.ce.cn. 
14. Kwan, C.H. (2006). Putting in place the legal framework for a market economy. China in Transition. 
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/china. 
15. LoPucki, L.M. (2000).The case for cooperative territoriality in international bankruptcy. Michigan Law Review 
(98): 7, 2216-2251. 
16. Luan, S. (2006). China’s top legislature adopts corporate bankruptcy law. www.chinaview.cn. 
17. Lui, Lee, and Li (2002). Border insolvency and informal workouts: A look at chinese taipei. 
http://www.oecd.org. 
18. McGowan, T. (2001). Special focus on banking: A call for reform. American Chamber of Commerce. 
http://www.amcham.com.tw.  
19. New Bankruptcy Law (2006). International Financial Law Review (24): 6, 94. http://www.iflr.com.  
20. Park, J. (2003). Country Report for the Republic of Korea. World Bank Global Insolvency Law Database. 
21. Takagi, S. (2004). Cross-border insolvency in Japan, International Business Lawyer, 15-17.  
22. UNCITRAL (1997). UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency. 
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/insolven/insolvency.htm. 
23. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2005). http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-
80722_Ebook.pdf. 
24. Wang, F. (2005). An overview of the draft enterprise bankruptcy law of the People’s Republic of China, China 
Law Developments. www.kingandwood.com.  
25. Westbrook, J.L. (2000). A global solution to multinational default. Michigan Law Review (98): 7, 2276-2328. 
26. Worldbank org (2007). http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS. 
27. Worldbank GILD (n.d.). Japan: Insolvency overview. http://www.web.worldbank.org.  
28. WTO (2007). Trade Policy Review: Japan. http://docsonline.wto.org. 
